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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a conviction following a conditional guilty plea for
trafficking in methamphetamine. R 131-132. Appellant Cecilio Alba asks this
Court to reverse his conviction because the district court erred in denying his
motion to extend the time to file a suppression motion; in particular, the district
court erred because the motion was filed before trial and just after new counsel
substituted in for prior counsel who had a conflict of interest in representing him.
In the alternative, Mr. Alba asks that this Court reverse his sentence of 15 years
fixed followed by 15 years indeterminate as the sentence is excessive.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts
Mr. Alba was charged by indictment with one count of conspiracy to traffic in
methamphetamine, LC.§§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(C), 37-2732B(b); 18-1701, and one count
of trafficking in methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4). R 26-31. His case was
consolidated with those of the alleged co-conspirators. R 34-35.
Mr. Alba was arraigned on March 14, 2014. R 56. Pursuant to the district
court's order governing further proceedings, motions to suppress were due no later
than May 16 or May 30, 2014, depending upon how the order was interpreted. R
50-51.
On April 30, 2014, new counsel entered the case. R 57-58. Thereafter, on
June 16, 2014, another substitution of counsel was filed. R 7 4-75.
On June 24, 2014, counsel filed a motion to enlarge the time to file pretrial

motions to June 27, 2014. In support of the motion, counsel averred that he had

the case on June 16, 2014, as a result of a conflict of interest which had
arisen with prior counsel; that the indictment includes 11 co-defendants and carries
a potential life sentence with a mandatory minimum of 10 years; that discovery to
date was in excess of 1000 pages with dozens of audio and video recordings; that
current counsel had identified potential ICR 12(b) issues; and that counsel was still
receiving further discovery disclosures from the State. R 77- 78.
That same date, June 24, 2014, counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence;
motion to suppress admissions/confessions. Mr. Alba sought suppression of
methamphetamine, currency, and paraphernalia found as a result of the
warrantless seizure and search of his vehicle, and suppression of
admissions/confessions obtained as a result of the illegal seizure and search of Mr.
Alba and his vehicle for the reasons that the admissions/confessions were coerced
and that the waiver of Miranda rights was coerced. Counsel requested a hearing
and that a memorandum to be filed in support of the motion be made part of the
record. R 79-80.
The court held a hearing on the motion. Defense counsel argued that
although the time for filing per the court's specific order of when pretrial motions
had to be filed had passed, 22 days still remained before trial. Tr. 6/27/14 p. 33, ln.
22-25. He further argued that he was not aware of the basis for the motion to
suppress until he received the case on June 16, 2014. Tr. 6/27/14 p. 34, ln. 20-23.
Counsel stated that the basis for the motion to suppress was that a so far
2

unidentified confidential informant was used and that promises were made to Mr.
to get him to sign the Miranda warning and consent to search. Tr. 6/27/14, p.
37, ln. 11-p. 38, In. 20. Counsel further stated that he was not going to alert the
State to all of the issues at that point, but if the court denied the motion to enlarge
time, he would do a proffer of what would haVf; been proved in support of the motion
to suppress. Tr. 6/27/14, p. 50, ln. 7-12. (No proffer was ever filed. ROA.)
The court denied the motion to enlarge time. The court stated that Mr. Alba
was represented throughout the proceedings and prior counsel had determined not
to file a motion to suppress, which was presumably a tactical decision by prior
counsel that the facts would not support a motion to suppress, and current counsel's
disagreement with that decision is not in and of itself good cause or excusable
neglect. Further, no fact had been offered to demonstrate good cause or excusable
neglect. Tr. 6/27/14, p. 51, ln. 1-p. 55, ln. 8. The court also denied the motion to
continue the trial date which counsel made after the denial of the motion to enlarge
time. Tr. 6/27/14, p. 55, ln. 9-p. 56, ln. 14.
On July 14, 2014, Mr. Alba entered a conditional guilty plea to the trafficking
count and the state dismissed the conspiracy count. Mr. Alba reserved the right to
appeal the denial of the motion to enlarge time to file a suppression motion. Tr.
7/14/14, p. 58, In. 1-p. 60, ln. 4; R 104.
In the plea colloquy, Mr. Alba told the court that he had asked prior counsel
to move to suppress the evidence against him, but they did not do so. Tr. 7/14/14, p.
73, ln. 11-18. Mr. Alba also told the court that he knowingly had about four pounds
3

of methamphetamine in his truck. Tr. 7/14/14, p. 81, ln. 1-2~-3.
The court ultimately sentenced Mr. Alba to an aggregate term of 30 years (15
fixed followed by 15 indeterminate). R 123-126.
Mr. Alba filed a timely notice of appeal. R 131-132.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Did the court err in denying Mr. Alba's motion to extend the time to file

his ICR 12(b) suppression motion?
B. Did the court err in imposing an excessive sentence?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court Should Have Granted the Motion to Extend Time
to File the Suppression Motion in Light of the Change of Counsel

Mr. Alba moved to enlarge the time to file a suppression motion just eight
days after new counsel appeared in his defense. Counsel explained to the court that
upon his entry into the case, he received over 1000 pages of discovery and dozens of
audio and video recordings. He also explained that he had entered the case because
prior counsel had a conflict of interest with Mr. Alba. He told the court that he had
filed the motion to suppress as soon as he realized that there was a meritorious
motion to be made and he noted that 22 days remained before trial was to begin.
The court denied the motion and stated that there was not good cause or excusable
neglect to support it and further noting that the court was going to be unavailable
for the remaining 22 days before trial.
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b)(3) requires that motions to suppress be raised
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to trial. Subsection (d) establishes the deadlines for filing

28 days after

of a plea of not guilty or 7 days before trial, whichever is earlier. The
subsection further allows the court to shorten or enlarge the time deadlines, and
"for good cause shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to
comply with this rule."
The question as to the timeliness of a motion to suppress at trial is a matter
of the district court's discretion. State v. Gerhardt, 97 Idaho 603, 605, 549 P.2d 262,
264 (1976), citing United States v. Maloney, 402 F.2d 488 (I8t Cir. 1968).
The purpose of the rule is to avoid "the serious inconvenience to jurors from
unnecessary disruptions of trial to deal with issues that could and should have been
raised in advance." State v. Gerhardt, supra.

In addition, Justice Bakes has

observed that bringing motions to suppress at the last minute unfairly deprives the
responding party the opportunity to gather evidence to meet the merits of the
movant's arguments. State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888, 712 P.2d 585, 590 (1985).
Another valid consideration is that of judicial economy and the impact that a
continuance of the time to file a motion to suppress will have on the efficient
operation of the justice system. State v. Irving, 118 Idaho 673, 675, 799 P.2d 471,
473 (Ct. App. 1990). But, of course, the overriding concern in a criminal prosecution
is that justice shall be done. Id., 109 Idaho at 892, 712 P.2d at 593 (Huntley, J.
dissenting), citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 8.Ct. 529 (1935).
Keeping in mind all of these goals, the district court's refusal to allow Mr.
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Alba's motion to suppress to be heard was an abuse of discretion. The refusal was
an abuse of discretion because there was good cause to allow an extension and
because an extension was consistent with the purposes of ICR 12.
Counsel's recent substitution into the case was good cause to allow an
extension of time. State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 6:3:3, 651 P.2d 566, 567 (Ct. App.
1982) (substitution of counsel may not require a court to hear and decide an
otherwise untimely motion, but will allow a court to do so.) In Lenz, the Court of
Appeals did not note why the substitution of counsel took place. In Mr. Alba's case,
the substitution occurred because prior counsel developed a conflict of interest with
Mr. Alba. When there is a conflict, it is not appropriate to assume, as the district
court did in this case, that prior counsel was acting in Mr. Alba's best interests and
that any failure to file a motion to suppress by that counsel was a tactical decision
based upon an analysis that such a motion would be meritless.
Given that there was good cause to extend, the question is whether an
extension would be consistent with the purposes of the Criminal Rule. And, in this
case, an extension would have furthered the purposes of the Rule.
First, an extension would not have inconvenienced any jurors because trial
was still 22 days away. See, Fox v. State, 685 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Alaska App. 1984),
noting that few cases have upheld a finding of waiver where a suppression motion,
though late, was filed prior to trial and referencing State v. Hall, 183 Mont. 511,
600 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1979), and Blahely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 860 (Wyo. 1975).
Second, an extension would not have deprived the State of an opportunity to
6

gather evidence to meet the merits of Mr. Alba's motion to suppress. While the
State did complain that it did not want to have to prepare for a motion to suppress
while it was preparing for trial, the motion to suppress was to be based upon
information already in the State's possession. Counsel stated that the motion to
suppress would be based upon the reliability of an undisclosed informant. The
State clearly knew who the informant was and his/her reliability and thus would
not need time to gather evidence to establish either identity or reliability. Counsel
further stated that the motion would be based upon allegations that promises were
made to get Mr. Alba to waive his Miranda rights and to make incriminating
statements. The State clearly knew who the officers were who were alleged to have
made the promises and so already had or could easily obtain the evidence needed to
rebut such allegations. In fact, the State, in opposing the motion to extend time,
argued against the merits of the motion in a way indicating that not only did the
State not need time to gather its evidence, but that it already was prepared to
argue the motion. Tr. 6/27/14, p. 40, In. 13-p. 47, ln. 20.
Questions of judicial economy also weighed in favor of granting the motion to
extend time. Although the court noted that it was going to be "essentially gone"
until trial, the court did ultimately take Mr. Alba's guilty plea prior to the date set
for trial and the court did not make any statement that another judge within the
court could not hear the suppression motion if the trial judge was unavailable.
Moreover, judicial resources are much more effectively deployed when motions to
suppress are heard by the district court prior to trial as opposed to putting off the
7

question of whether evidence should have been suppressed to post-conviction
proceedings which require an entire new civil suit to address the suppression issue
in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
And, lastly the concern for justice favors hearing the motion to suppress even
though it was filed after the ICR 12(b) deadline. As ,Justice Huntley set out in

Alanis, supra:
[G]ood cause to hear the motion nonetheless existed because [the
defendant] should not have to go through trial and then raise the issue
of counsel competency on appeal or in a petition for post-conviction
relief simply because [his] counsel had not been conscientious.

State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho at 890, 712 P.2d at 591 (Huntley, J., dissenting).
If the motion to suppress is meritorious, justice favors resolving the question

prior to putting Mr. Alba through a trial, an appeal, and a post-conviction
proceeding. If the motion is not meritorious, justice still favors resolving the
question prior to trial because justice is best served when those subject to its
punishments know that it has been fairly administered.
Under the circumstances of this case, the district court erred in denying the
motion to extend time to file the suppression motion. This Court should vacate Mr.
Alba's conviction and remand with instructions to hear the suppression motion.
B. In the Alternative, the Sentence is Excessive

The district court sentenced Mr. Alba to an aggregate term of 30 years with
the first fifteen fixed and the remaining fifteen indeterminate. Mr. Alba now asks
this Court to reverse the sentence because it is excessive.
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This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion making an
independent review of the record focusing on the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710
(Ct. App. 1982); State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 1 H, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15
(Ct. App. 1991). A sentence is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. A sentence longer
than necessary for these purposes is unreasonable and must be reversed. Toohill,

supra.
Mr. Alba was 25 years old at the time of sentencing. PSI p. 1. He was born in
Mexico to parents who separated when he was six months old. He was sent to live
with his grandparents who worked in the fields. After the separation, he only saw
his mother two more times, once when he was five or six years old and once in his
early teens, both times for just a few minutes. He did not see his father again until
he was 14, when he was sent to live with him and his step-mother in California.
PSI p. 6. When asked for a family history, Mr. Alba was unable to give an address
for any relative. PSI p. 5. Except for a single uncle, who he talks with, and a fiance
who was expecting his daughter at the time of sentencing, Mr. Alba is essentially
without a family and has been since he was 17 years old and dropped out of school.
PSI p. 6-8.
At the same time, Mr. Alba's legitimate work history was approximately four
months of work as an auto mechanic. PSI p. 9.
9

Mr. Alba reported that he had lost many friends and family to crime. In 2010
five cousins were killed, two by being burned alive. PSI p. 6. And, he himself
had a prior felony conviction for which he had served time in prison in California.
PSI p. 5. He was candid that he undertook the illegal drug work because he
thought it was easy money that would allow him to provide for his daughter. He
said, "[I] wanted my daughter to have what I could never have but I wanted to get it
in the wrong way. Now for my mistakes she won't have a father for years." PSI p.
10-11.
Yet, Mr. Alba cooperated with the police upon his arrest. He confessed not
only to the actions immediately preceding his arrest, but also to many other drug
trafficking events, telling the police that he had brought as many as 30 pounds of
methamphetamine to Boise since the summer of 2013. PSI 42-46.
And, his LSI-R score placed Mr. Alba only in the moderate risk category, not
the high/very high risk categories. PSI p. 11.
Per statute, the district court was compelled to sentence Mr. Alba to a
mandatory 10 year fixed minimum term. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(C). However, the
court exceeded that and imposed a fixed term of 15 years followed by 15
indeterminate. This sentence was excessive for the protection of society,
rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution. Given Mr. Alba's background, his
cooperation upon arrest, and his LSI-R score, the mandatory minimum was
sufficient to meet the Toohill sentencing goals. The additional five years of
minimum term are excessive.
10

If this Court does not grant relief through reversal and remand to hear the
suppression motion, Mr. Alba asks that the Court reverse his sentence and remand
with instructions to impose a lesser fixed term.

V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Alba asks this Court to vacate his conviction and remand because the
district court erred in refusing to extend the time to file a suppression motion. 1n
the alternative, he asks that this Court reverse his sentence and remand with
instructions to impose a reduced sentence.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of December, 2015.

Deborah Whipple
/
Attorney for Cecilo Pon6e Alba
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of December, 2015, I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing document to be:
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to: Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
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